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Shahid Javed Burki’s Changing Perceptions and Altered Realities: Emerging 
Economies in the 1990s is a collection of his essays and speeches on a variety of 
economic issues relevant to developing countries. These range from the trend 
towards open regionalism in the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC) to the 
challenges of integrating into the global economy faced by small states. 
Three points in particular are of great help in understanding the nature of the 
problems faced by emerging economies over the past decade. First, there exist great 
differences within the developing world and, by extension, in the ranks of the poor. 
Second, the complexity of the situation demands that domestic institutions in 
developing countries be made stronger and more efficient. And third, market-based 
policies, though far from perfect, represent the best available set of solutions to the 
many problems faced by the developing world. 
Burki was appointed the World Bank’s Vice President for Latin American and 
Caribbean region in 1994, after serving for seven years as the Director of the World 
Bank China Department. Having witnessed the East Asian miracle first-hand, the 
author came to the realisation that the problems of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region were in many respects unique. The comparison chart presented in the book 
reveals several intriguing phenomena. 
In the this region liberal democracy is in vogue, economic decision-makers 
are foreign-educated, there is broad political support for the Washington 
Consensus, wealth distribution is the most unequal in the world, and the rates of 
urbanisation and urban poverty are very high. East Asian countries, however, 
exhibit greater economic nationalism, have the least unequal wealth distribution in 
the developing world, reject liberal democracy, and possess a locally trained 
economic élite. 
In terms of performance, the differences are just as marked. The Latin 
American and Caribbean  region has endured decades of stagnation, poorly thought 
out state interventions, and a centralised approach to human development. East Asia, 
by contrast, has enjoyed decades of spectacular economic growth rates that have 
considerably reduced the incidence of poverty. 
The developing world is not a homogeneous geo-economic entity. Burki 
identifies three distinct categories into which developing countries may fall.  The 
first consists of those countries that have successfully integrated their economies into 
the global market (for example, South Korea). The second covers those countries 
that are increasingly irrelevant to the global market (for example, Sub-Saharan 
Africa). The third includes those countries that are integrated at some levels and 
marginalised at others (for example, the Middle East and South Asia). 
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The poor are not a homogeneous class. On the one hand, there are those 
segments of the poor population that can benefit from high rates of economic 
growth. On the other, there exist the “chronically” poor, who are not affected by 
economic growth (for example, Native Americans in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region).  Burki points out that inflation and economic downturn really hurt 
the first category of the poor.  It is very important that governments keep human 
development spending steady even during recession, to prevent permanent damage to 
the social fabric.  One wonders how exactly  it is  possible for states not to cut back 
on social services in times of economic duress given that a standard prescription 
given by international financial institutions (such as the IMF) to aid recipients is to 
reduce fiscal deficits. Keeping the social fabric in good shape is possible only if 
domestic institutions are strong enough to respond to the challenges faced by 
developing countries.  Strong institutions translate into good governance that, in turn, 
creates conditions which are conducive to investment and economic growth. 
The chapter on crime and poverty provides an excellent illustration of this 
linkage. In the absence of a sound criminal justice system and efficient law 
enforcement agencies, crime will flourish.  A high crime rate increases the amount of 
risk involved in investing and destroys human/social capital. High risk will result in 
low levels of investment and employment, leading to a further increase in crime. 
What Burki does not pay adequate attention to is the fact that in many developing 
countries there also exists a strong link between crime and wealth/power.  Crony 
capitalism, which Burki does address, organised crime, tax evasion, money 
laundering, and illegal loans, are just some of the things in which the so-called élites 
in the developing world indulge. 
Also open to debate is the manner in which domestic institutions are to be 
strengthened. The most popular formula nowadays is that the state devolve power to 
the districts so that communities may address their human development needs 
directly. The irony of the situation is that in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, where democracy prevails at the national and state levels, human 
development policies are relatively centralised and, as Burki notes, decentralisation 
of political power has created problems of its own. In East Asia, however, where 
states are authoritarian (even if the government is democratically elected), human 
development policies are comparatively decentralised. 
The basic theme, which cuts across all of Burki’s speeches, essays, and 
reflections, is that market-based policies are the developing world’s greatest hope. 
The empirical evidence in favour of jumping on the bandwagon of economic 
liberalisation is, admittedly, very impressive. The case study of China, in particular, 
demonstrates how even a communist giant can, through a properly managed 
transition to the free market, go from a low level of economic development to the 
middle level within a generation. 
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But what would a global order truly based on the market mean in practice? 
Burki’s answer to that is almost triumphant: “… a new international economic order 
has in fact emerged. However, it was not produced by the political will of 
governments, but by the needs and perceptions of the marketplace. If I were to pick 
three groups of actors that have contributed more to the emergence of the new global 
order than any others, they would be central bankers, financial regulators, and credit 
agencies… If governments want to act, they should prompt and facilitate the work of 
these agents of change”. (p. 103.) 
A less charitable, though perhaps more accurate, way to put it would be that in 
the face of a market dictatorship run by an élite technology, states and societies must 
submit or global financial turmoil will be prolonged. Under these circumstances, 
political democratisation means very little and, indeed, enlightened authoritarian 
states may be better equipped to respond to troubled conditions. 
In regard to globalisation, Burki highlights the various routes people believe it 
may take and scores two very important historical points.  One is that world trade as 
a share of world output was higher in 1913 than in 1975.  The other is that net 
financial flows made up a larger share of world savings before WWI than in the mid-
1990s. What is truly revolutionary about globalisation is the dramatic advance in 
communications technology such as the Internet. 
The longest chapter in the book is devoted to Pakistan.  Viewing Pakistan’s 
economic development in a historical perspective, Burki demonstrates that the 
Pakistani leadership has a truly uncanny ability to fail to take advantage of major 
opportunities. To make matters worse, a certain Mr Z. A. Bhutto initiated a process 
that “…was to result in the total destruction of the country’s institutional base”. (p. 
142.) Nationalisation, in particular, greatly increased the scope for exploitation and 
decreased economic efficiency; it also did away with fiscal conservatism (a hallmark 
of the much-derided colonial legacy). 
If Pakistan is to lift its masses out of poverty, then an economic growth rate of 
6.5 percent per year will have to be sustained for 10–15 years. Even at an economic 
growth rate of 4.0 percent, the number of people living below the poverty line in 
Pakistan will increase from 54 million to 82 million by 2010.  What is truly 
disturbing is that from 1965–1990 Pakistan seemed to be winning the war on 
poverty. The statistics show that the past ten years have witnessed the reversal of a 
very promising trend. What the numbers cannot express is the sheer increase in 
human misery that they represent. 
Viewed in this context, restoring high rates of growth is as much a moral and 
political imperative as it is an economic one.  Burki recommends that Pakistan 
should concentrate on human development, embark on a serious privatisation 
programme, reduce the level of state arbitrariness, and aggressively promote the 
export sector. 
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Changing Perceptions and Altered Realities: Emerging Economies in the 
1990s represents the opinions expressed by an international bureaucrat at numerous 
functions on a wide range of issues. A remarkably consistent argument, the wealth of 
data used, and plenty of perceptive observations make for an enlightening and 
absorbing read. 
 
Ilhan Niaz 
Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 
 
